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Introduction
An interlinkeddeal is one in which two or more interdependentex-
changesare agreed upon bythe contractingparties, Thepriceof a com-
modityin one markettherefore,cannot be isolatedfrom the price of the
other commodity in another market.
Empirical evidence showsthat many of the lenders in the informal
rural credit market engage in interlinkeddeals (TBAC 1978and 1981;
Qui_ones1982; Floro1986; Bardhanand Rudra1978). This isspecifically
true among trader-lenders who comprise most of the lenders in the rural
area(TBAC 1978;Quir_ones1982; Floro 1986). These studies also show
that both lenders and borrowersengage in interlinkedcredit-output market
deals.
Rural agents engage in interlocking market transactions to minimize
costs due to underdevelopment of rural markets.This study assumesthat
agents will naturally involve themselves in interlinked deals due to the
structure of the rural economy - its imperfect and incomplete markets,
assymmetry of information, high risks and the nature of agricultural
loans. This study aims to model the economic behavior of agents in a
credit-output market. Specific behavior of borrowers and lenders will be
looked intoto determine howthese agents interactwith one another using
a single-lender and a many lender case. The reasons for interlinkage
found in the literature will be assumed and will not be studied. However,
the monitoring processand the provisionof finance capital to be usedfor
production inputs in order to ensure adequate output will surface in the
optimizing behavior of the economic agents. While there are several
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theoretical work on the behavior of agents in a credit-output market, not
much have beendone to model the economic behaviorof trader-lenders
and their farmer-borrowers. Most of the theoretical work are done in the
context of a landlord-tenant relationship. So far, only Floro (1986) has
looked into the behavior of trader-lenders and farmer-borrowers in a
credit-output market.
Section 2 presents a discussion of the theoretical model. Section 3
verifies the hypothesis arising from the model and finally Section 4 gives
the summaryand conclusion ofthe paper.
The Model,
The model makesthe following initial assumptions. The farmer bor-
rowsfrom a trader-lender,since most rural banks or other formal financial
institutions are reluctant to lend to small farmers. The trader-lender, on
the other hand, is willing to extend loans to these farmer-borrowers.
These trader-lenders normally have sufficient capital compared to other
informal lenders, to meet the credit requirements of farmer-borrowers.
Farmer-borrowers use loans either for production or consumption. As-
sumingthat farmer-borrowers are heterogeneous,with varying production
and input demand functions, then the purposes for which they use their
loans determine the nature of their maximizing behavior. A farmer-bor-
rower using his loan for production maximizes his income while a farmer-
borrower who uses his loan for consumption maximizes utility. The
trader-lender engaged in an interlinked credit-output activity maximizes
his profits. He knows how a specificfarmer-borrower behaves and there-
fore acts accordingly. If the farmer borrows for production purposes, he
would ensure that sufficient inputs are used to generatethe right output.
On the other hand, if the farmer borrows for consumption purposes, he
ensuresthat maximumeffort isexertedby the farmerto generatedesired
output.Thebehaviorofthefarmer-borrower isthus incorporatedinthetrader
lender's maximization problem. It may be argued that with imperfect in-
formation, the foregoing may be difficult to achieve. However, in a rural
setting where trader-lenders reside in the areaswhere they operate and
where relationships tend to be personal, it is not very difficult for the
lender to know how his clients behaveand classify them accordingly. In
the following,thispresumptionwill bemade,allowingustoseparatelymodel
the decisions made according to whether the purpose of borrowing is
production or consumption.
Behavior with Production Loans
Because of relatively underdeveloped markets in rural economies, aGERON: MICROECONOMICBEHAVIOUR 3
farmer obtains a loan from a trader-lendertypically by engaging in a tied
sale of his output, i.e. he promises to pay his loan in kind and sell the
remaining amount of his produce to the sametrader-lender.Under this ar-
rangement, the farmer-borrower is able to borrow from the trader-lender
without the necessity of a land collateral (Floro1986). At the sametime,
the trader lender,through the interlinkeddeal, is assuredthe output ofthe
farmer months in advance before the actual purchase. Thus, he ensures
that the farmer gets sufficientfinance capitalto purchaserequired produc-
tion inputs so that output can besufficientlysupplied.
With the foregoing motive for interlinkage, the trader- lender is faced
with an incentive problem which resemblesthat confronting a landlord-
lender in the interlinkage literature. The problem of the trader-lender
resemblesthe problem of the principal in a principal-agent relationship, al-
though there are some important differences. There is no uncertainty in
this model, hence there is no problem of confounding effort and adverse
consequences. The contract arrived at is always "first best." Theadverse
selection problem is also assumed away since the trader-lender can dis-
tinguish between those who maximize income and those who maximize
utility. Thus,this model is a more modest attempt to delineatethe shape
of the first-best contract under certainty, when markets are linked.
Behavior of afarmer-borrower with production loans
The farmer isassumed to be an income maximizerwith respect to his
farm activities.
Let p .be the price offered by the trader-lender for the farmer-
borrower's output and i the interest rate charged by the lender on the
farmer's loan.
Assuming that the amount borrowed by the farmer borrower (L) is
equalto histotal outlayoninputs, I,thenthis impliesthat input expensesare
entirelyfinanced by borrowings. Thefarmer-borrower is assumed to sell
all his output to the trader-lender. Hence his residual cash income is
defined by the following:
(1) Y= pX(I,N)-I(1+i)
where Xgives the farmer's total produce (Xi > 0, XN > 0, XII,XNN < 0)
and N the farmer's size ofthe land. Effort is not included in the borrower's
production function since the amount of effort exerted by each borrower
per unit of land (N) is assumed to be the same across borrowers. (Al-
though the function X may differ across borrowers.) Moreover, it is as-
sumed that the farmer-borrower maximizes his income from production.
He seesto it that the amount heborrows generates maximumincome for4 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
him. In this case, there is no need to "monitor" the effort of the farmer. If
this assumptionis not satisfied,then the farmer behavesas one who may
usethe loan for consumption purposes (asthe farmer-borrower described
inp.11)andwho thereforerequiresmonitoringofeffort. Sincepayments are
made in kind, a farmer-borrower will only borrow up to the amount I°
where:
(2) pX _ I°(1 + i) or i° < pX/(l+i)
where I° isthe ceilingfor the.farmer's borrowings.
The farmer-borrower then maximizes his residual cash income, Y by
choosing the appropriate level of input demand, i given p and i. For an in-
terior solution,
(3) Yt = pXt- (1+i) =0
Equation(3)then resultsin the following:
° (3a) X_= (1 + i)/p
This equation implicitly defines I as a function of p, i, and N, i.e. I =
I(i,p,N). With the assumptionof strict concavity of X(I,N),we obtain li < 0,
Ip > 0, and in '> 0. (SeeAppendix 1 for a formal derivation.) That is, an
increasein i (respectivelyp or N) hasa negative (respectivelypositive)ef-
fect on the borrower's loan demand. More accurately,note that, I =
I((1 +i)/p,N). This also shows that various combinations of i and p are
consistent with unchanging loan demand I.
Sinceiand phaveopposing effects ondemandedI,which eventually
hasaneffectonthefarmer-borrower's incomeY,there arethereforevarious
combinations of p andi which result in a constant income for a farmer-
borrower.We term this as an iso-incomecurve,with a slope given by slope
Y which is
dp/di = X/I >0
andwhich isconcavetothe origin in the p-iplane.(The slopeand the shape
of the curve are shown in Appendix 1). Figure 1 illustrates such an iso-
income curvefor a farmer borrowing for production purposes. This means
that for a constant incomefor a farmer-borrower, an increase ini should be
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The trader-lender's behavior with production loans
Let us now look at the decision problem of the trader-lender who ex-
tends production loans to farmer-borrowers behaving in the manner
described above.
Since the farmer-borrower sells his entire output to the trader-lender,
we let Xj (the farmer's total production) be the total volume of produce
bought by a trader-lender from an individual farmer-borrower j
(4) Xj=xj(I j,N j) xJl >0 XJN >0
where Ij is determined f.rom the farmer's optimizing problem as discussed
previously, and where Xj isthe production function of farmer j. We assume
the trader-lender has access to the formal financial market, where he either
has an opportunity cost r for his excess funds or where he seeks loan
assistance, also at a rate r,to further finance his trading activity. He lends to
the farmer with interest i. It is assumed he can sell the farm produce at some
market price P. He offers to buy the farmefs produce at price p.
The trader-lender's objective function is then formulated as follows:
,,n
(5a) Max H = ,_ (e .- pJ)X + (iJ-r)lj
j=l
(5b) s.t. Xj = xJ(IJ,NJ),all j
(5c) Ij = IJ(iJ,pJ,NJ), all j
where it will be noted Ij is the solution to the farmer's optimizing problem in
(1). This implies that in maximizing his profits, the trader-lender knows how
a farmer-borrower behaves.
The solution to (5) may be thought of in two ways. First, either the
lender has an absolute financial constraint B°, which limits the Ioanable
•amount. Then (5) must be augmented by another constraint:
(5d) Ij < B°
The other possibility is that the lender has access to unlimited funds at
the market rate r, in which case (5a)-(5c) need only be supplemented by
the condition that
(Se) Rj > 0 for all j
Taking either interpretation, it can be seen that the lender is maximiz-
ingHJseparately for each farmer j (since (5a) is separable in its argu-
ments), computing optimal (pJ,i j) pairs for each j, which in turn determineGERON;MICROECONOMICBEHAVIOUR 7
the loan demand Ij. In any event, the situation will allow a ranking of
farmer-borrowers {1,2,...j ....}, where
H1 > H 2 > ...H j > ..,
Where (Sd) is relevant, the lender may be viewed as simply moving
down the list of borrowers until B° is exhausted. Where (5e) is relevant,
on the other hand, the lender simply moves down the list and chooses all
borrowers j for which Hj > 0. Without loss of generality and for
simplicity therefore, the subscript j can be dropped and the lender's
decisions can be examined with respect to a single borrower. Hence:
(6) Max H = (P-p)X(I,N) + (i- r)l(i,p,N)
from which the following first order conditions can be derived:
(6a) Hi = (P - p)X)li + (i- r)li + i(i,p,N) =0
(6b) Hp = (P-- p)Xilp-X(I,N) + (i- r)lp = 0
A trader-lender therefore maximizes his profits at the point where the
following hold true:
• (6a') li (PXI -_ i) + I = li(pXi + r)
(6b') Ip (PXl + i) = Ip(pXl + r) + X
i.e the marginal revenue from a change in p or i should be equal to the
marginal cost due to the same change in p or i. The trader-lender could
increase i or decrease p as long as the addition to his revenues, both from
the credit and output market, is equal to the additional cost brought about by
the increase in i and decrease in p. Note that changes in i and p affect both
the revenue and costs of a trader-lender since they affect the amount of
credit borrowed by a farmer-borrower which in turn affects the amount of
output that can be bought by the trader-lender.
A trader-lender will charge a different i and necessarily p per farmer-
borrower depending on the latter's characteristics, as represented by the
size of land and the production function. This is so since the farmer-bor-
rowers may be heterogeneous with respect to production and input
demand functions resulting in varying volume of output available to the
trader-lender per farmer-borrower. Considering the foregoing results, a
trader-lender will charge a farmer-borrower an i and p which equates his
marginal revenue to his marginal costs.8 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Flexible interest-price determination
A lender involved in interlocking transactions is able to maximize
profits by employing flexiblelending terms. From the first order condition
in (6a) and (6b),the following can be derived:
(7a) P-p -- [- (i- r)li - I(i,p,N)]/X_li
(7b) P-p = [X(I,N) - (i- r)lp]/Xtlp
This indicates the possibility that a trader-lender may charge a low or
even zero interest rateaslong as he can buythe farmer's output at a price
which is much below the prevailing market price. Note that for i=0, the
RHSof both (7a) and (Tb) are positive. The first order conditions need
not be violated for some p < P. Note that a trader-lender can charge
various combinations of i and p as long as this will result in some mini-
mum income representing some reservationincome, for the farmer-bor-
rower. This is illustrated in Fig,2. Ho is the curve which gives (i, Px)
coordinates that will yield a constant profitHo. This isthe iso_profitcurve.
Equation (3a) and equation (6) show that p and i are positively re-
lated. For a constant positive profit, an increase in i should be accom-
panied by an increase in p since i and p haveopposite effectson I which
influence X and ultimately the trader-lender's profit.
Suppose Pis the prevailing market price of output and r isthe prevail-
ing cost of capital. Thediagram showsthat points A, B,and C, yield the
same levelof profitto the trader-lender. At pointA, P > p but i < r. At point
C, P < p but i > r. Notethat he may even charge azero interest rate,as in
E,as longas hebuystheoutput atOE,apricewhich iswellbelowthe market
price P. Losses in the credit market may be offset by gains in the output
market.
Suppose further that Ho is the maximum profit for the trader-lender,
an interior maximum solution for the trader's problem requiresthe profit
functionto bemore concavethan the incomefunction.
Evidenceon the existence of zero rural interest rates in fact validate
this possibility.Resultsconcur with Basu's(1983)argument that a zero in-
terest rate should not necessarily be taken as an indicator of peasants
being better off. This is because in an interlinkedcredit-output market, i
and p cannot be separatedfrom each other, i cannot be strictly defined as
the cost of credit in credit market nor p the cost of product in the output
market.
In interlinked markets, peasantswho pay no interest may get a lower
price for their produce, one which is way below the prevailing market
price. Thus,chargingani < rmay notnecessarilyimproveapeasant'swell-
being.GERON: MICROECONOMICBEHAVIOUR 9
Loan elasticities and price and interest differentials
From (6a)and (6b), the following expressions are obtained for the
interest and price elasticilies of loan demand, we get the following:
(Sa) Ei/i = -1/(P-p)Xl + (i-r)
(8b) Epl/P = X(I,N)/(P-p)XI + (i-r)
where
Ei is the interest elasticity of the farmer-borrower's
loan demand
Ep is the elasticity of the farmer-borrower's loan
demand with respect to buying price
Equation 8a and 8b show that as the farmer's demand for loan be-
comes more elastic (as farmers' loan demand becomes more sensitive to
interest rates and buying price of output, i.e. E i becomes a larger nega-
tive number and E p becomes a larger positive number), output price and
interest rate differentials (P-p)and (i-r), respectively) become smaller
implying inability of the trader-lender to exact higher i or lower p and
therefore less profit for the trader-lender. This is further explained by the
following: as loan demand becomes more interest and price elastic, an
increase in i or a decrease in p will reduce I which in turn reduces X and
may ultimately reduce the trader4ender's profit.
Since interest inelasticity is more prevalent among poor farmers
having no other sources of financing, large differentials between P and p
and betweeen i and r are more likely to be found among these borrowers.
Among farmers with relatively greater resources, loan demand may be
more elastic since these farmers have a wide array of lenders including
formal sources to choose from. This theoretical result conveys that com-
petition among lenders (which make E i and E p more elastic) make inter-
est rate and price differentials smaller. Furthermore, if loan elasticities are
assumed across borrowers, a situation arises where lenders may not
necessarily prefer richer farmers if bigger price and interest differentials
can be charged due to smaller loan elasticities of poorer farmer-bor-
rowers. This breaks the results derived by Floro (1986) wherein trader-
lenders are thought to lend more to larger- sized farmers.
Including operation costs
If P > p and i > r, this could lead to a quick conclusion that a trader-
lender garners extra profits. However, note that aside form the direct cost
incurred by the trader4ender in both the output and credit market (i.e. r10 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE OEVELOPMENT
and p), he stillincursanamount of operationcostto coverthe costsof his
fixed investments (e.g. warehouses, trucks, mills, etc.)and other costs
(transportation, information costs,etc:),This is clearly shown by including
these costs (C) in the profit function of the trader-lender. Therefore,let C
= gj(Xj)sincethe amount of atrader's costs depend onthe volume of his
purchases. Thus the trader-lender's profit function for a single borrower
becomes:
(9) T[ = (P-p)X(I,N) + (i-r)L(i,p,N) - g(X)
Maximizing the foregoing expression results in the following first order
conditions.
(9a) F[i = (P-p)Xjli + (i-r)li + I(i,p,N) - g'Xtli = 0
(9b) t-[p = (P-p)Xtlp - X(I,N) + (i-r)lp - g'XiIp = 0
These conditions simply state that for a single traderJender in an area,
maximum profits are realizedwhen the sum of the marginalrevenuefrom
each individual borrower isequalto the total marginalcosts.
Since a higher volume of trade with an individual borrower results in
lower cost per unit of quantity on the part of the trader (lower MC) and
since profit maximization requires MC=MR, a trader-lender maximizing
profits may reduce his MR from that borrower through an increase in
buying price or a loweringof interestrate.
Hence, part of the difference betweenthe prevailing market price for
output and that which a trader-lender pays his borrowers and the dif-
ference between the interest charges and the oppurtunity cost of money
to the trader-lender maybe accounted for as paymentfor his other opera-
tion costs (transport cost, deliverycost,etc.)and his ownership of specific
assets such as warehouses, trucks, mills, etc.and as payment for other
costs.
Similarly, g(X) could also,be interpreted as the cost incurred by the
trader-lender in delivering services to the farmer-borrowers. These ser-
vices include delivery of loan to farmer-borrowers and pick-up of output
loan payment. Hence,for a trader-lenderwho has fixed investmentsand
who delivers varied services to his farmer-borrower client, g(X) increases
and consequently also his marginal costs.Thus,to attainoptimum profits,
he increases his marginalrevenue per individual borrower. This therefore
impliesthat the differentialsP-pand i-r increasewith improvements (which
entailan additionalcost to the trader-lender)inthe services extended by
the trader-lenderto his borrowers.GERON: MICROECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 11
Behavior with Consumption Loans
Behavior of a farmer-borrower with consumption loans
Aside from production loans, farmers also borrow to augment if not
totally finance, their consumption needs. Stylized facts suggest that a
sizeable number of borrowers in the rural areas,particularly in some crop
areas like coconut, borrow not to finance their production needs but
rather their subsistence. This practice is common among farmer-bor-
rowers cultivating crops which do not require large production inputs.
Farmers engaged in copra production provide one example. The follow-
ing model isadopted from Braverman and Srinivasan (1982), with the fol-
lowing assumptions: The farmer-borrower at the beginning of each
season borrows his entire consumption needsfor the coming seasonand
repays his loan with interest at the end of the harvest season. No stocks
are held from one seasonto the next, nor arethere any investment oppur-
tunities. Thus, in any season a farmer borrows an amount c for con-
sumption equalto the amount of his income (pX) atthe end ofthe season
discounted by (1 + i), where p,X,and i havethe same meaningsas inthe
previous sections.
(13) c = pX/(1 + i)
Equation (13) simply says that the higher the discounted value (using i as
interest rate) ofthe gross output of the farmer, the larger the consumption
loan hecan obtain. Thefarmer's output X is given by
(14) X = X(e,N)
where e isthe production effort exerted by the farmer-borrower and N the
size of land beingcultivated.Theassumption of having standardized effort
across borrowers is now dropped. The rationalefor this will be explained
when the trader-lender's behavior is addressed. Input demand is as-
sumedto depend only on N, hence Iis fixed per borrower. X is a concave
function with continuous first and second-order derivatives, Xe>0, and
Xee< O.
Unlikea productionloan,whichisseenbya farmer-borrower asan in-
vestment with expected returns, a consumption loan is treated by the
farmer-borrower as a commodity that enters his utility function. Afarmer's
choices are limited to the amount of cons.umptionhe consumes in the
next period and the amount of effort he exerts to be able to attain the
desired level of consumption. However,since c becomes a function of e
(from equation (13) and (14)), in effect the farmer's control variable is e12 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
alone. The farmer-borrower's maximization problem becomes
(15) Max U(c, e)
e S.LX = X(e, N)
C = pX/(1 + i)
The farmer's utility function is assumed to be quasi-concave with Ui> 0,
Up < 0 and Uii, Upp < 0. Maximizing (15) with respect to e yields the fol-
lowing first-order condition:
(16) . Ue ={Ue pXe/(1 + i) + Ue}= 0
From which the following can be derived:
(17) Xe = -Ue(1 + i)/Ulp
Since Ue< o, this implies that i ispositively and p is negatively related to
Xe (the marginal product of effort)_ Assuming diminishing returns to e, the
forego!ng implies a negative-relati0nship between e and i anda positive
one between e and p. Hence,
(18) e = e (i,p) ei < 0 ep > 0
This means that if i is higher, less effort is exerted, and if p is higher, more
effort is exerted. Formal derivation of the foregoing relationship is given in
Appendix 2.
Similar to the behavior of a farmer-borrower borrowing for production
purposes, i and p also have opposing effects on e which eventually has an
effect on a farmer-borrower utility. There is also4herefore,a combination
of i and p which gives a farmer-borrower constant utility (iso-utility curve).
The slope of this curve is shown by the following:
dp/di = -ei/ep > 0
The derivation of the slope and shape of Uo is shown in Appendix 2.
Figure 3 shows the iso-utility curve of a farmer-borrower borrowing for
consumption purposes. Note that Uo is also concavewith a positive
slope in the (i- p) plane.
Thetrader-lender's behavior with consumption loans
The foregoing shows that a farmer-borrower's behavior differs,
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who borrows production loans borrows to produce hence maximizesin-
come, while a farmer-borrower who borrows for consumption purposes
borrows to consume (hence maximizes utility). Since a trader-lender's
main motive is higher profits through an expansion in trading activity, his
lending behavior will differ depending on the type of farmer-borrower he
deals with. A trader-lender who extends a production loan is interested in
having his loan repaid and in being able to buy the maximum amount of
output from the farmer-borrower. He is primarily interested in the produc-
tivity of the loan (I) he extends. Becausea farmer-borrower with produc-
tion loan is an income maximizer,he will exert maximumeffort to be able
to produce more. Thus,the trader-lendercan already influencethe output
through the very tangible production inputs.
A trader-lender who extends consumption loans, on the other hand,
becomes interestedin e,that isassumingthat e can be observed. Likethe
trader-lender extending production loans, the main objective is still to
maximize profits and to expand trading activity. He is still interested in
having his loan repaid and in being able to buy the maximum output from
the farmer-borrower. However,hebecomes interested in e, sincethe bor-
rower now maximizes utility with consumption and leisure as main argu-
ments. The amount he borrows and eventually repays depends on the
utility he attachesto both consumption and leisure.
Moreover, a trader-lender becomes interested in e, since it is the only
way by which he can affect the total produce of a farmer-borrower which
is his primary interest. He cannot influence production through I, since
the loan he extends is used for consumption purposes, nor can he in-
fluenceN for itisassumedfixed per borrower.The amountof produce a
farmer-borrower hasdeterminestheamountof outputto whichthe trader-
lendercan haveaccess.
Whenconfrontedbyanyfarmer-borrower j, the trader-lender'smaxi*
mizationproblemis
n




Without loss of generality,the subscriptj can again bedropped and con-
sider only the decision with respectto a single borrower. The constraints
inthe maximization problemare substitutedto obtainthe following:
(20) Maxl] -- (P- p)X(e(i,p),N) + (i-r)pX(e(i,p),N)/(1 +i)14 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Maximizing (20)with respectto i andpyieldsthe following first-ordercon-
ditions:
(20a) ]-[i -- Xp(1+r)/(1 +i) 2 + [(P-p) + (i-r)p/1 +i]Xlei = 0
(20b) _p = -X(f +r)/(1 +i) + [(P-p) + (i-r)p/1 +i]Xlep -- 0
Dividing the firstequationbythe secondresultsinthefollowing:
(21) - ei/ep-- io/(1+i)
whichimpliesthatat an optimum,the rateat whichan increasein i can
be replacedbya decreasein p withoutanydecreaseinthe effortlevelof
a farmer-borrower(hence maintainingthe level of X to be sold to the
trader-lender)shouldbeequalto the discountedoutputpricegivento the
farmer-borrower.
Thus,a trader-lenderextendingconsumptionloansto hisborrowers
expandstradedvolumeby influencingthe farmer-borrower's levelof ef-
fort,whilea trader-lenderextendingproductionloansdoesso byinfluenc-
ing the farmer-borrower's levelof inputdemand.Again,as inthe case of
productionloans,onecannotdistinguish betweenpand i aspaymentfor
outputand paymentfor creditrespectively.
Itmustbenotedthat the resultsdescribedin p.6 wheretrader-lenders
rank the farmers according to profits derived, p.8 (flexible interest-price
determination) and p. 9 (relationship between loan elasticityand interest
and price differentials) andp. 10 (including operation costs), all apply to
consumption loans aswell.
Behavior of Agents: Verification of Hypotheses
Severalpropositionshave been raised in the theoreticalframework.
Thesepropositions maynowbeverified.
Does a/ender invo/ved in a credit-output market
inter/inkage system prefer to/end to farmer-borrowers
with bigger resource status?
Table 1 showsthat lendersdo not lend to thosewith bigger land
sizes.Amongpalayfarmer-borrowers onlysixpercentof thosewho bor-
rowedfrom trader-lendershave land sizes greater thanthree hectares
while among coconut farmer-borrowers,around 17 percentof the total
loansextendedwenttothesetype offarmer-borrowers.Mostof the loansTabfe 1
m
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fanrner 63_0 24,01 2.48 3 _0000 75.99 3 .91 3 0 0.00 0._0 -- 0 0.(30 0.(30 0 26320 3.02 6 I_O
nl
-j-
Toter _ 29.28 100.00 173 511480 58,71 100.00 118 98120 11._6 100.00 14 66_O 0.76 100,00 1 PJ71265 100.00 309 _>
<
Ptopo_on of ;at-
mere ia each la/ld '*"
size oato9o_ 55.9 38,2 4.5 1,5
Average loan size 1474 4334 7000 1320
Coconul Borrowe:rs
lrader4en_ars 17712 31.96 52.00 22 13666 24,66 52.59 31 13278 23,96 79,00 20 10700 19,31 5&15 6 55426 58.14 86
friends 4800 19.55 14.09 9 12020 48.96 46,26 22 2030 8,27 12.08 9 5700 23.22 30.98 5 24550 25.75 50
relatives 1_5,50 88.52 33.91 7 300 2.25 _,15 2 1500 11,24 8,92 2 0 0.00 0.00 0 1335_ 14.00 1T
farms; 0 0,00 0.00 0 0.0(3 0.00 0 0.00 O,0O -- 2000 **** 10.87 0 2000 2,10 1
Tolal 34062 35.73 '=00.(30 38 25986 27.26 100.00 55 16808 17.63 100.00 31 18400 19.30 100.0011 95326 100.00 142
Proport_oa of formers
in each tend s_ze
category- 28.7 38.7 21-,8 16.9
Average loan s/ze 896 471 542 375
1/l_roporlionof loans exteeded to each group by specific Fenders to total loans extended bythe same lenders
?j Pl"oporlion ot each lender's Ioaes extended to each group16 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
for both crops went to those cultivatingthree hectaresor less.Apparently,
land sizes do not seemto make a big difference among farmer-borrowers.
Majority of those who borrowed from trader-lenderswere cultivating only
around one to three hectaresof land.
Among palay farmer-borrowers, averageloan size increasesas size of
land increases as opposed to that of coconut farmer- borrowers where
loan per farmer was higher among those with smaller land sizes. This is
becausepalayloans, which are mostlyusedfor productionpurposesin-
creasewith increasesin land sizes. On the other hand,coconutloans
whichare mostlyfor consumptionpurposesdo not increasewith land
size. Itshouldbe notedthatthisgoesagainstthe theoretical assumption
thata farmer-borrower borrowsanamountc for consumption equalto the
amountof hisdiscountedincome (pX(e, N)/ (1 + i)at harvesttime. The
assumptionimpliesthat consumption loan increasesasthe farmer'ssize
of land increases. The seemingcontradictionmay be explainedby the
fact thatthosewithbiggerlandsizemayhaveothersourcesof incometo
tide them over untilthe next harvestseasonand thus borrow smaller
amountsonly.
Theforegoingshowsthatmostlendersdo notlendtothosewith big-
ger land sizes.Thiscouldbe explainedby the fact thatfirst,biggerland
sizedfarmersget more formalloansso interlinkedmarketand informal
sourcesof credit are more prevalentamong farmerswith smallerland
size.Second,trader-lenders do notnecessarilyget largerprofitswith big
land-sizedfarmers. Theoreticalresultsshow that if smallerland-sized
farmershaveloandemandinelastic to bothinterestrateand buyingprice,
(becausesmallerfarmersdonothaveanyothersourcesofcredit),thenin-
terestrateand pricedifferentials may allowthe trader-lenders to havehigh
profits. This resultdiffersfrom Floro (1986)who claimed that trader-
lenderspreferto lendtofarmer-borrowers withbiggerresourcestatus.
A positive relationship is hypothesized to exist between i
(interest rate) and p (output price) for a constant profit, a
constant utility or constant income, all other things being
constant.
It was shown that in an interlinked market, lenders areable to employ
flexible lending arrangements. Becausedeals are intedinked,the price of
credit (i) in the credit market and the price of the farmer's produce (p) in
the output market cannot be.isolatedfrom one another. As shown in Fig-
ure 2,there is a locus of points Awhich shows the combination of i and p
that yieldsthe sameamount of utility or incomefor the farmer-borrower.
Admittedly, the relationship between i and p can best be validatedGERON: MICROECONOMICBEHAVIOUR 17
using information fromthelenders'side. However,mostofthelenderswere
apprehensive todivulgethe needed information.
Thus,farmer-datawas usedtotestthe hypothesizedrelationship between
i andp.
Table2 showsthatasexpected,mostofthe farmer-borrowers in both
developed and less-developedareasreceived output prices which were
below the average market price. These farmer*borrowers, however, paid
annualinterest rates rangingfrom 0 to 120percent.
The table shows little variation in prices for both palay and coconut.
However,the interest rate seemsto fluctuate widely. As explained earlier,
the buying price and the interest rate are determined by many factors
(Pm,r,elasticity of loans with respectto price and interest,land size, etc.).
The specific relationshipbetween i and p for a certainlevel of income
or utility for a farmer-borrower or for a particular level of profit for the
trader-lender cannot be deduced from the table due to identification
problems (since income, utility and profits and other variablesvary from
farmer to farmer). Another method however of showing the relationship
between iand p isto useregressionanalysis. This isshown in Table 3.
Regression results show that among palay farmer-borrowers, output
price differential (P-p) is positively relatedwith interest rates implying that
buying price (p) and interest rates (i) are negatively related. This goes
againstthe hypothesized positive relationship between i and p. This may
be a case of omitted variable. Operation costs (which include cost of ser-
vices rendered) incurred by palay trader-lenders should beconsidered as
anothervariableaffectingi. Thisis sobecauseoperation costs significantly
affect the prices paidby the trader-lenders. An increase in the operation
costs,dueto betterand improvedservicesrendered, incurredbythetrader-
lendermay resultin higher interestrateschargedand low buying pricepaid
bythe lender tothe borrower. Omissionofthis variablemayleadto abiased
estimate of the coefficient of (P-p) resulting in reversive sign. Operations
cost cannotbe incorporated in the equation because data on this variable
arefrom the lender data-set while the data onthe rest of the variables are
fromfarmer-data.
The foregoing is supported when the other factors affecting the
variability of interest ratesare considered. Resultsshowthat among palay
farmer-borrowers, another significantvariableaffecting interest ratesisthe
level of development of the area (Table3). The variable has a negative
coefficient implying that interest ratesare higher in more developed areas.
This is consistent with the results in Table 4 whereinhigher interest rates
were observed in more developed palay areas compared to the less
developedones.
The above resultin palayareas couldbe explainedby the following:
Higherinterestrates in palaydevelopedareasaredue to better and im-Table 2 _o
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FARMER-BORROWERS' LOANS
BY INTEREST RATE AND OUTPUT PRICE RECEIVED
INTEREST RATE RECEIVED
PRICES RECEIVED Zero .1 to 60 60.1 to 120 > 120
(in Pesos) No. % No, % No. % No, % Total %
PALAY
1 to 3 hectares 11 100.00 20 100.00 7 100.00 3 100.00 41 100.00
tess than 2.50 8 72.73 6 30.00 4 57.14 3 100.00 21 51.22
2.51 to 3.00 3 27.27 43 65.00 3 42.86 0.00 19 46.34
3.01 to 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00




3.1 to 5.0 hectares 9 100.00 20 100.00 9 100.00 1.00 100.00 39 100.00 >
t-
less than 2.50 5 55.56 i0 50.00 4 44.44 1.00 100.00 20 51.28 o
-I1
2.51 tO 3.00 2 22.22 9 45.00 5 55.56 0.00 16 4t.03 -_
3.01 to 3.50 1 11.11 1 5.00 0.00 0.00 2 5.13 i-
3.51 to 4.00 1 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 2.56 "o
rll
greater than 5.0 has 1 100.00 4 100.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 5 t00.00 o
Ill
less than 2.50 0.00 1 25.00 0.00 0.00 1 20.00 <
Ill
2.51 to 3.00 1 100.00 2 50.00 0.00 0.00 3 60.00 r- o
3.01 tO 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00
3.51 tO 4.00 0.00 1 25.00 0.00 0.00 1 20.00 m Z
"Hm
30
Table 2, continuation, o • • Z
INTEREST RATE RECEIVED -'n
O PRICES RECEIVED Zero .I to 60 60.1 to 120 > t20 m






1 to 3. 0 hectares 2 0.00 7 100.00 1 100.00 0 0.00 10 100.00 >
<
fessthan 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00
3.01 to 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 c 30
3.51 to 4.00 i 0.00 6 85.71 1 100.00 0.00 8 80.00
4.01 to 4.50 1 0.00 1 14.29 0.00 0.00 2 20.00
3.01 to 5.0 hectares 3 100.00 8 t00.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 11 100.00
lesstha 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00
3.51 to 4.00 1 0.00 6 85.71 1 100.00 0.00 8 80.00
4.01 to 4.50 2 66/67 8 100.00 0.00 0.00 10 90.91
greater than 5.0 has. 3 I00.00 13 100.00 0 0.00 1 100.00 17 100.00
lessthan 3.00 1 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 5.88
3.01 to 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00
3.51 to 4.00 1 33.33 11 84.62 0.00 1 100.00 13 76.47
4.01 to 4.50 1 33.33 2 15.38 0.00 0.00 3 17.65
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Table 3
FACTORS AFFECTING THE LEVEL OF INTEREST RATES
Dependent Variable




P - p 0.186 0.289 2,32
TOTAMTAV 2.74 x 10 0.052 0.378
RBL 0.11 0.052 0.416
AREA (size) 0.265 0.114 0.846
TYPEAREA - 0.998 - O.182 - 1.34







P - p --0.028 -0.975 -4.619
TOTAMTAV -7,56 X 10 -0.107 -0.695
RBL 0.723 0.324 2.501
AREA (size) --0.158 -0.281 - 1.45
FINCOME -8.16 x 10 -0.196 -0.868
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Table 4





No. % No. % No. %
Effective Interest Rates
equal to 0 119 37,7 172 66,9 291 50.8
.01 - 10.00 50 15.8 60 23.3 110 19.2
10,01 - 20.00 12 3.8 4 1.6 16 2.8
20.01 - 50,00 40 12,7 9 3.5 49 8,6
50,01 - 100.00 86 27,2 8 2.3 92 16.1
100.01 - 150.00 4 1,3 1 0.4 5 0.9
greater than 150.00 5 1,6 5 1.9 10 1.7
TOTAL 316 257 573
Average 75.3 32.95 56.3
Average for Palay 114,72 16.71 87.18
Average for Coconut 2.27 60 53,8622 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
proved servicesextended by lendersinthe areas.The serviceswhichare
prevalent in developed areas compared to less developed areas,include
timely releasesof loan, release ofloan atthe form neededbythe client (i.e.
either in cash or in kind), pick-up of output payments and door-to-door
delivery of loan. In less developed areas, borrowers bring their output to
the trader from whom they owe a loan while in developed areaspayment
for loans in output termsare picked up by the trader-lenderthemselves.
Likewise,it may also be due to the higher opportunity cost of capital
in more developed areas. This is so becausethere are more investment
opportunities in more developed areascompared to the less developed
areas.
The above observation validates our hypothesis that an increase in
the operation costs (g'(X)) of a trader-lender results in an increase in the
differentials(i-r) and (P-p). Thus,the higher effectiveinterest rates prevail-
ing in developed areasare due to better and improved servicesextended
by lendersto his borrowersand not due to competition among lenders.
Also,among palayfarmer-borrowers,the ratio of borrowers to lenders
does not significantly affectthe level of interest rate. This may be ex-
plained by the fact that lenders lending to palayfarmer-borrowers do not
necessarilycompete in terms of interest ratesand palay pricesbut rather
in terms ofthe quantityand quality of servicesthey offertheir clientele.
Onthe other hand,Table 3 also showsthat among coconutfarmer-
borrowers, iand p are positively related. Notethat even if operationscost
is not includedin the regression equation, a positive relationshipbetween
i and p was observed. This is so because amongcopra trader-lenders,
operations cost is not a significantvariable affecting the output prices.
It should benotedthat the v_riablefor level ofdevelopment of anarea
is not included in the regression equation for coconut farmer-borrowers
inasmuch as most of the farmer- borrowerswith relevantdata arefrom the
less-developedareas.
The ratio of borrowers to lenders (RBL) affects i significantly only
among coconut farmer-borrowers. This impliesthat in coconut areas, an
increase in the number of lenders in an arearesultsin lower interest-rates.
Thus in coconut areasboth the positive relationshipbetween i and p and
the competition among lenders are validatedby the data.
Summary and Conclusion
Thefarmer-borrowerengagedin interlinked dealsbehavesaccording
to the purposefor which he makes his loan. If he uses his loan for
production purposes,he maximizeshis income while if he uses his loan
for consumption purposes, he maximizeshis utility. Thefarmer who bor-GERON: MICROECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 23
rows for productionpurposesuses inputdemand (I ) as controlvariable
while thefarmer who borrows for consumption purposes usesthe amount
of effort per unit of land (e). The trader-lender knows how a farmer-bor-
rower behaves and thus incorporates the farmer-borrower's behavior in
his maximization problem. He playswith the interest rate (i) and the price
at which he buys the farmer's output (p) in maximizing his profit. Since
deals are interlinked, any changes in i or p affect both his revenue and
costs. An increase in i or a decreasein p, resulting in increasedrevenues,
affects the amount of credit borrowed by a farmer-borrower and eventual-
ly the amount of output to which a trader lender can have access. This
also results in increased costs if the output is reduced due to effect of i
and p on I and e). He then employs flexible lending arrangementswhich
vary perfarmer-borrower.
The empirical results show that in more developed areas,where it is
presumedfor many lenders to exist, higher interest rates were observed.
This is due to improved and better services employed by lenders in these
areas. This is consistent with the theoretical resultthat operation costs in-
curred by trader- lenders affect the i and p they charge. Higher interest
rates may also be due to the higher opportunity costs of money in more
developed areas.
The foregoing assumes that the existence of interlinked deals in the
informal rural credit market addresses efficiency problems. The high
transaction and risk costs associated with rural lending are addressed by
interlocking market transactions. Costs associated with one market are
absorbed by the other market. Flexible lending arrangements enable
agentsto operate at efficiency.
Hence, in an economy where income is low, where market is seg-
mented and where high transaction and risk costs exist, the presence of
informal lenders is useful on efficiency grounds. Their usefulness how-
ever,may not necessarilybetrue when equity considerationsare made.
Given this, the first-best solution is still to increase rural incomes. By
increasingthe incomes of farmer-borrowersand bymakingthose fixed in-
vestments normally owned by trader- lenders availableand accessible to
the farmer, problems of market segmentation and high transaction and
riskcostmaybeaddressed.
This can be achieved by overallagriculturalpoliciesto increase
farmer'sincome(i.e.policiesthataddressbothgrowthand equityobjec-
tives): agrarianreform, provisionof strongersupport services by the
government suchasmarketingservices,timelycreditinformation, storage
facilities (warehousingfacilities e.g. Quedan financing scheme), and
strongsupportfor locallyinitiatedcooperatives that willprovidefarmers
directaccessto finance capital(e.g. creditcoops)and enable them to
market their produce at reasonable prices (e.g. marketing coops).24 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Provision of the necessary serviceswill make boththe inputand output
marketscompetitive resulting inlower prices.
Meanwhileat the intermediatestage,the concept of cooperative sys-
tem or self-help groups could be advocatedto foster competition with in-
dividual private,moneylenders. With the cooperative or self-help group
system, both the efficiency and equity issues confronting informal rural
credit markets may be taken into account. The rural market imperfection
issue may be addressed since these .systems can operate under the
marketinterlinkagestructure. Theequity issueon the other hand, istaken
care of since these groups are basically owned by the farmers themsel-
ves. The profits generatedfrom the interlinked deal will therefore accrue
to them.GERON: MICROECONOMICBEHAVIOUR 25
APPENDIX 1
Formal Derivation of the Behavior of Agents
with Production Loans
A. Derivation of the input Demand Function of a Farmer-borrower
(A1.1) MaxY = pX(I,N) - I(1 +i)
F.O.C.
(A1.2) YI = pXl - (1+i) =0
The second order condition requires
_zy/812 = pX'_ 0
which is fulfilled by the assumption on the concavity of X. (A1.2) defines I
implicitly as a function of i, p, and N, i.e. I= I(i,p,N).
To solve for li, Ip, IN we let
F = pX'- (1+i)
(A1.3) li = -Fi/Fi = 1/pX"<0
(A1.4) Ip = - Fp/Ft = X'/pX" >0
(A1.5) IN = -- FN/FI = X'/pX"">0
We know that Xh XN > 0 and by strict concavity of X, X,, XNN < 0. if in




B. The Trader-Lender's Behavior
(A1.7) Max[[ = (P-p)X + (i-r)l26 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
S.t. X = X(I,N)
I= I(i,p,N)
The first-order conditions are:
(A1.8) Hi = li[(P-p)Xi + (i-r)] + I = 0
(A1.9) Tip = Ip[(P-p)Xi + (i-r)] - X = 0
The second order conditionsfor a local maximum requires that
]-[ii < 0 and ]]ii ]]pp - ]r[ip2 > 0
By carrying out the derivation, we find that the following signsare implied:
(A1.10) ]']ii = li[(P-p)Xllli + 1] +
[(P-p)Xl + (i-r)]lii + li<O
(A1.11) ]]pp = Ip[(P,p)Xllli- Xl] +
[(P- p)XI + (i- r)]lpp - Xllp<0
(A1.12) Rip = li[(P-p)Xlllp - XI] +
lip[(P-p)Xi + (i-r)] + Ip>0
(A1.13) l]pi = ip[(P-p)Xllli + 1) +
Ipi[(P-p)Xi + (i-r)] -Xlli>0
These conditions are satisfied, given the derivative signsfor li, Ip, lii, Ipp,Ipi
in (A1.6).
C. Deriving the slope and concavity of Yo
LetYo = pX(I,N) - I(1 + i)
Getting the total derivative of Yo
(A1.14) dYo = p[Xl(lidi + Ipdp + Indn) + XNdn]GERON: MICROECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 27
+ Xdp - Idi - (1+i)(li + Ipdp + IndN)
GroupingthetermsandlettingdY = 0,dN = 0
di[li(pX1- (1+ i)) - I] + dp[Ip(pX1- (1+ i)) + X] = 0
the slopeis
dp/di = -li(pX1 - (1+ i)) - I/Ip(pXl -- (1+ i)) + X
Inthiscase pX1- (1+ i) = 0 sincewearealwaysassumingthe borrower
optimizes.Hence
(A1.15) dp/diy=yo = I/X
To determinethe shape of the curve,we get the secondderivativeof
equation(10)
(A1.16) d2p/di 2 = d(I/X)
-- [Xli -IX'li]/X 2 = li/X2[X-IX1]
We knowfrom equation (A1.2)thatX_ = (1+ i)/p
Substitutingthisintothe secondterm of equation (A1.16)
X -IXI --.X - I(I +i)/p
Butour constraintsays
pX _>(I + i)l
and for a strictlyconcavefunctionX,this isa strictinequality
Hence: pX > (I +i)l which impliesthat
X (I +i)llporX - 1(1+i)Ip > 0
therefore
d2p/di2 = li[X -IX1]/X 2 < 0
or Yoisconcaveinthe (i-p)plane28 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
APPENDIX 2
Formal Derivation of Behavior of Agents
with Consumption Loans
A. Derivationof the effortfunctionof a Farmer-borrower
(A2.1) Max U(C,e)
s.t. X -- X(e,N)
C - pX(e,N)/(1+ i)
whereUc >0 Ue <0
Ucc,Uoe,Uce,Uec< 0
Xh XN > 0
Xlh XNN < 0
Through substitution, (A2.1) may be reduced to maximizing a function in
e, namely
Max U[pX(e,N)/1+ i, e]
Thefirst-order condition then requires
(A2.2) Ue = Uc(pXo/1 + i) + Ue = 0
Thesecond-order condition requires
(A2.3) Uoo= Uce(pXel(1 +i)) + Uc(pXeol(1 +i)) + Ueo < 0
which isfulfilled by the assumptionon the concavity of U and X.
To solvefor ei and ep,we let
(A2.4) F -- Uc[pXoI(I+i)] + Uo. Then
ei = --Fi/Fe
(A2.5) Fi = p/(1+i)[Xe(UccpX/(1+i)+ Uc)+ UecX]GERON: MICROECONOMICBEHAVIOUR 29
The expression in bracket may be rewritten as UccC + Uc, since
C = pX/1 + i. If we assume that the elasticity of the marginal utility of con-
sumption is greater than or equal to unity, i.e. -UccC/Uc>I, then the said
expression is negative, and Fi is negative.
(A2.6) Fe = p/(1 +i)[Xe(UccpXe/(1 +i) + Uce) + UcXee
+ UecXe] + Uee < 0
Using the assumptions on U and X, Fe< 0, therefore
ei = -Fi/Fe < 0
Again_using the implicit function theorem,
ep = -Fp/Fe
(A2,7) Fp = -1/(1 +i)[Xe(UccpX/(1 +i) + Uc) + UecX]
using the same argument in equation (A2.5), we know that equation (A2.7)
is positive.
Using equation (A2.6) and (A2.7), we know that
ep = -Fp/Fe > 0
Therefore
e = e(i,p) where ei < 0, eii < 0
ep > 0, epp < 0
eip > 0
The second derivatives are sufficient to fulfill the second-order condition =
for a local maximum for the trader-lender's maximization problem.
B. The Trader-Lender's Behavior
(A2.8) Max l-[ = (P-p)X(e(i,p),N) + (i-r)pX(e(i,p),N)/(1 +i)
The first-order conditions are:30 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(A2:9) ]'[i= pX[p(1 + r)/(1 + i)2] +
[(P- p) + (i- r)p/(t + i)]Xeei = 0
(A2.10) np -- -X[(i-r)/(1 +i)] +
[(P - p) + (i- r)p/(1 + i)]Xeep = 0
The second-order conditions for a local maximum requires that ]]ii< 0
BI'EI['Iii ]["[pp-- _ip2 > O.
By carrying out the derivation, we find that the following signsare implied:
(A2.11) I-[ii = -2pX[(1 +0/(1 +i) 3] + 2p(1 +r)/(1 +i)2Xeei
+ [(P- p) + (i- r)p/1 + i][Xeeii+ Xeeei2 ] < o
(A2.12) . ]'Ipp = -2[(1 +r)Xeep/1 +i] + [(P-p)+(i-r)p/1 +i]
[Xeepp+epXeeep] < 0
(A2.13) IIpi = (1 +r)/(1 +i)[X/1 +i-Xeei] +
[(P -_p) + (i- r)p/1 +i]
[Xeepi+epXeeei] + Xeep[(1 + 0/(1 + i)2]> 0
(A2.14) Rip = elXl[-(l+r)/(1 +i)] +
(1 +0/(1 +i)2[pXle2 + X]
+ [(P- p) + (i= r)p/1 + i][Xeeip+ Xeeeiep] > 0
These conditions are satisfied, giventhe derivative signs for el, ep, eii,epp,
eip, epi.
B. Deriving the slope and shape of Uo
Let U = U(C,e)GERON:MICROECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 31
----U[pX(e,N)/(1 +i), e(i,p)]
Getting the total derivative of U
(A2.15) dU -- UcdC + Uede
= Uc[p/(1 +i)(Xe(eidi + epdp) + Xndn]
+ Ue(eidi + epdp)
LetdU = 0 and dN -- 0 and grouping the terms:
di[ei(UcpXe/(1 + i) + Ue)] + dp[ep(UcpXe/(1 +i) + Ue)] = 0
The slope of Uo istherefore
(A2.16) d p/diu =Uo = - ei/ep
To determine the shape of the curve, we get the second derivative of
equation (A2.9)
d2p/di 2 = d(ei/ep)/di
-- -- 1/ep2[eidep/di - epdei/di]
which is also equal to
d2p/di2 = - 1/ep2[ei(epi- eppei/ep)-ep(eii- eipei/ep)]
= - 1/ep2[eiepi - eppei2/ep- epeii +eipei]
= _ 1/ep3[2eiepiep - eppei2 - ep2eii
Thus,
d2p/di2 < 0
or Uo is concave in the (i- p) plane.GERON: MICROECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 33
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